We study conflict on multiple fronts. A defending player needs to successfully defend all fronts and an attacker needs to win at only one.
Introduction
A military player is sometimes forced to fight on two or more fronts, and split up his forces in an effort to defend each of them. An example of such a two front war is World War I in which Germany had to fight against France in the West and against Russia in the East. Otto von Bismarck had used much of his diplomatic effort in trying to isolate France and prevent Germany from being encircled and ending up in a multi-front war, by devising a policy of alliances after the German-French War of 1870. 1 After he was dismissed in 1890 his policy was discontinued. When the threat of a two front war became imminent, the Germans tried to deal with it by developing, and eventually trying to implement, what is known as the Schlieffen Plan. This was a blitzkrieg against France that should ideally have been finished by the time the Russian army was fully mobilized. When this plan had failed, Germany ended up in a two front war.
There are many other situations in which one player faces threats on multiple fronts, and where success is assured only if he is successful on all of them. Guarding and defending a city that has many gates is a further example in the military context that depicts the nature of the problem well.
Supply chains, chains of command, or information that can be intercepted or interrupted at several links, exhibit similar, multiple vulnerability. Intercepting such chains at one of the links may be sufficient to make all of them useless. This also applies to the context of business and administration. If 1 For this claim, see, for instance, Becker (1923 Becker ( /1960 and Hartung (1930, p. 15) .
For a more general assessment, see also Andrews (1965) . German generals, like Moltke the elder, had already been concerned about such a possibility in 1871 (see, e.g., Flammer 1966/67, 207; Förster 1987 ).
an organization is vulnerable along several dimensions it may survive, or be successful, only if it is protected on all dimensions. To sabotage production successfully, it may be enough to succeed in sabotaging one component of a product, or in interrupting the production chain at one point. A similar logic applies in politics. A politician may have done, or said, many things in the past that make him vulnerable in several dimensions. To sabotage his campaign or to destroy his reputation, it may be enough to be successful in one dimension. Finally, consider a human body that is attacked by a virus.
Several cells will typically be attacked by a number of viruses. For the attack to be successful in a first round of infection, it may be enough for one of these cells to be invaded successfully. All these examples have in common that the defending player is exposed to an attack at several points, and that a defeat at any of these points implies a final defeat for the defending player.
2
The multi-front war with the weakest-link/best-shot property puts the defending player at a strong strategic disadvantage. As we show in section 2, if the number of fronts is large, the defending player essentially becomes indifferent to whether to surrender or fight, and his payoff is reduced to the one he receives from surrender. In the equilibrium, the defending player surrenders with positive probability, and also fights back with positive probability. with the respective problems of attack. Accordingly, weakest link and best shot often emerge jointly and for the same problem, and it is therefore interesting to study the interaction between two rivals or rival groups, one facing a weakest link problem and the other facing a best shot problem.
The analytics of multiple battlefields
Consider two players A and D. Player A attacks a country and player D defends it. The country is protected by mountains and other natural obstacles, but there are n points or possible fronts at which an attack can be made and has some potential for being successful. Player A decides at which points to attack, and can try and attack any number of these fronts. 
Player A wins with a probability that is equal to 1 minus the probability that D wins along all battle fronts. He has to bear his cost of effort which is the sum of the efforts in the different contests. The payoff of D is equal to his probability of winning all battle fronts times the valuation of winning, minus the sum of efforts y i :
Note, that v A is the prize that A attributes to winning at least one battle, and v D is the prize that D attributes to winning all battles. 4 These prizes may, but need not be, identical. 5 For instance, the gain an army may expect from successfully conquering and plundering a city is likely to be less than what the citizens lose in this case, particularly if plundering goes along with vandalism and violence.
Player D wins the conflict at front i with probability
and
The contest success function (3) is well known from many areas of application. The win probability of a contestant in (3) is determined like in a lottery in which A and D both purchase lottery tickets that all go into one urn, one ticket being drawn randomly and determining the winner. 6 Note, that p i D (0, 0) = 1 describes that, if no attack occurs on front i, the defending player wins on this front, even if he does not make any positive defence effort. While this assumption is plausible, it is a tie-breaking rule that is useful in what follows, but it is not crucial for the qualitative results. The possibly different unit cost of efforts for defence and attack allow for a local asymmetry between attack and defence at each front, taking into account an important claim in the theory of military strategy that suggests that there 5 The value of winning is independent of the effort expended here. In some types of conflict, effort choices may reduce or increase the value of winning, as in Cooper and Restrepo (1967), Skaperdas (1992) , and Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1998). 6 In the literature on conflict (3) was first suggested by Tullock (1980) , axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) , Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997) to unity, this would be described here by a unit cost a = 3 for the attacking
player.
An equilibrium in pure strategies is described by a pair of feasible effort
for all feasible y. The equilibrium may be in mixed strategies, which are defined naturally, i.e., as cumulative distribution functions of feasible pure strategies.
We now note the following property that will simplify the equilibrium considerations.
Lemma 1:
If y i = y j > 0 and x i 6 = x j for i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, then A can weakly increase his payoff by choosingx i =x j =
and y i 6 = y j for some i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, then D can weakly increase his payoff by choosingŷ i =ŷ j =
Intuitively, suppose a city has n identical gates. An attacker sends an equal number of soldiers to gates 1 and 2. Then the defending player should optimally not send more troops to one gate than to the other. Lemma 1 helps reduce the complexity of the n−dimensional effort choice of each contestant to a one dimensional problem of choosing effort levels that are uniform across the different fronts. The lemma rests on the assumption that contest success is governed by the same rules along all fronts. We prove the following proposition in the Appendix:
then an equilibrium exists and is
characterized by player A choosing x = (x * , x * , ..., x * ) with
and player D choosing y * = (y * , ..., y * ) with
, then an equilibrium exists and is characterized by
and by q * = 1. Both players have strictly positive payoffs in this equilibrium.
Three factors determine whether the equilibrium is characterized by allocates some effort to each front, it becomes very likely that the attacker will win at least one battle contest, even if this effort is not high, and this is sufficient for him to win the overall game. The attacking player benefits from an increase in the number of fronts: each additional front gives him an additional chance of victory. In contrast, the defending player does not like additional fronts. Defending a particular front is not particularly rewarding if there are many fronts, as the attacker is in any case likely to be successful on one of the other fronts. In the case of an increase in the number of fronts, to keep the probability by which he is successful along all fronts constant, the defending player would have to expend more effort at each of the fronts and increase the win probability at each front, as his win probability is the product of the win probabilities for each single front. This is very costly, and increasingly so the more fronts there are.
The nature of the mixed strategy equilibrium in (i) can also be explained in intuitive terms. Player D has zero payoff in this equilibrium. Zero payoff does not imply, however, that D expends zero effort along all fronts with probability 1 in the equilibrium. If y = 0 always, the attacker would win for sure with an infinitesimally small effort. But given this infinitesimally small effort by A, the choice of y = 0 would no longer be optimal for player D, as D would need only a small amount of effort to drive the win probability at each front up to close to 1. Hence, the defending player cannot simply give up with certainty. He can also not optimally choose a given amount of effort with certainty: the strictly positive effort levels that are locally best responses to each other would imply so much defence effort that the defender's payoff would become negative, so he would be better off abstaining from any defence effort. Accordingly, the defending player randomizes between zero effort and a strictly positive effort y * . With an increase in the probability q by which D expends this positive effort y * , it becomes worthwhile for player A to also expend higher effort x * . The equilibrium q causes the mutually optimal replies y * and x * to be just low enough to make the defending player indifferent between giving up and choosing the optimal positive effort y * .
Note that the probability with which the defending player chooses zero effort increases in the number of fronts, and in the ratio v A /v D of player's valuation.
If there are only a few fronts, if the valuation of winning is sufficiently higher for the defending player than for the attacking player, or if the local advantage of defence is sufficiently high, av D > (n − 1)v A may hold and the equilibrium is as in (ii). In this case, it is worthwhile for the defending player to consistently, and always, defend all fronts. Both players expend mutually optimally chosen efforts uniformly along all fronts.
Note that av D > (n − 1)v A is always fulfilled if there is only one front, as in the standard Tullock (1980) contest. This shows that adding an additional front qualitatively changes the nature of the problem.
Historically it can be seen that cities that came under siege sometimes surrendered, and sometimes fought and tried to succeed. 7 This fits with the equilibrium properties in the mixed strategy equilibrium in (i). Some of these cities may fight, even though they are essentially indifferent between early surrender and likely surrender after considerable resistance. The main result suggests that it is in the interest of a defending player to have only few weak points at which he can be attacked. The reduction in the number of these 7 It should be mentioned that the attacking army often made the cost of losing the conflict for the inhabitants of the city that is under siege a function of their defence behavior and resistance, which complicates the picture further. Many instances reported, e.g., by Runciman (1954/94) for the period of the crusades provide some illustrations.
points may be more important than making it easier to defend each of these points. The attacker has the opposite interest and would like to be able to attack on more points. This may apply to defence structures in military conflict, but also to non-military applications. It may call for institutions that are designed in a way that makes them vulnerable only at a few points.
The result also has implications for the formation of alliances. In the con- fronts. Allowing for these asymmetries, the payoff functions can be re-defined replacing the cost term in (1) by Σ n i=1 a i x i and in (2) by Σ n i=1 d i y i , respectively. This problem can generally not be reduced to a problem in which both players maximize along a single dimension. 9 As shown in the Appendix, if there is an 9 A sufficient condition for the problem to reduce to a problem in simultaneous one-equilibrium similar to (i) in which the attacking player chooses some effort vector (x * 1 , ..., x * n ) and the defending player chooses y = 0 with probability (1 − q) and (y * 1 , ..., y * n ) with positive efforts with the remaining probability q, the equilibrium win probabilities that emerge from such asymmetries in those cases in which the defending player chooses the optimal positive defence effort y
A large effort cost of player A or a small effort cost of player D at a particular battle front i turns into a higher probability for the defending player winning this battle front in the equilibrium. Intuitively, consider, for instance, player D defending several town-gates. Suppose it is more costly to defend gate 1 and more costly to attack gate 2. These asymmetries lead to an equilibrium in efforts in defence and attack that make it more likely that a successful invasion will occur at gate 1.
Discussion
A fundamental asymmetry between attack and defence comes into play if the defending player is vulnerable at several points and has to be successful in protecting all these points against the attacker who wins if he is successful at at least one such point. Using the language from military conflict, we denoted these points as fronts in a war, where an attacker wins the war if he wins at least on one front, and the defending player wins the war only if he successfully defends all fronts. We considered this problem using the most commonly used contest technology that has the property of globally decreasing returns, such that an attacker is willing to attack simultaneously dimensional choices is that a i /d i ≡ γ for all i = 1, ...n, with γ a positive finite constant. at several such points.
A key result is that the defending player is willing to give up if the number of vulnerable points is sufficiently large, because the amount of resources needed to optimally react to an attack along all these possible fronts becomes so large that such effort is not better for this player than the option to expend zero effort. In the equilibrium the defending player gives up with a certain probability, but fights with some remaining probability. The probability of giving up is higher the larger the number of vulnerable points or fronts. should try to minimize the number of fronts at which they can be attacked, and attackers may find it profitable to increase the number of points at which they can attack. As alliances may change the number of points of attack, this effect may increase the strategic value of alliances.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider π A in (1) . Let y i = y j ≡ y > 0 and
A's payoff can be written as
Define Q n k6 =i,j 
The optimal x * must maximize (8) , with p i D (x i , y * i )) defined in (3). Using Lemma 1, given y * 1 = y * 2 = ... = y * n ≡ y * , the maximum has x i = x j for all i , j. The maximization problem can be re-written as
The first-order condition of this problem is
To see this, note that
for y > 0 and q > 0. Finally,
> 0 at x = 0, and, hence, π A (x * , y * , q * ) > 0, which completes the proof that x * is a globally optimal reply given q * and y * .
Consider next the optimal reply of D, given the equilibrium candidate choice by A. Player D chooses y to maximize
Using again Lemma 1, given
n ≡ x * , the maximum has y i = y j for all i , j for all i = 1, ..., n. Therefore, the payoff function (2) can be re-written as
The first order condition for an interior maximum is
By inserting x * from (4), it can be checked that y
Further, inserting y * and x * into π D in (13) yields π D (y * , x * ) = 0. Accordingly, for x = x * , player D is indifferent to whether to expend effort y =(y * , ..., y * ), or y = 0, or to randomize between these choices with a probability q * .
It remains to be shown that y = y ), and strictly concave for y ∈ ( y * 2 , K). Accordingly, the function has, at most, two local maxima, one being the local interior maximum at y = y * , and the other at y = 0.
The equilibrium payoff of A follows from inserting the equilibrium values of effort and for q * into (9) and simplifying. This payoff is strictly positive given av D ≤ (n − 1)v A , as a sufficient condition for this to hold becomes n n (n−1) n > 2, and n n (n−1) n converges towards e > 2 for n → ∞. The equilibrium payoff of D follows from the fact that y = 0 is in the equilibrium support and yields π A = 0.
Turn now to the case with av D > (n − 1)v A . In this case (4) and (5) are the simultaneous solutions of the first-order conditions (10) and (14) for q * = 1. Moreover, for av D > (n − 1)v A , the payoff of both players A and B is strictly positive for these values, and the convexity/concavity properties of (9) and (13) hold unchanged. Hence, the local optima characterize global optima.
The solutions (4) and (5) and (6) ( 1 8 ) For each i, (17) and (18) 
